







Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica 
 




The limits of consequentialism: 











First version:  May 2005 
This version: October 2005   2
The Limits of Consequentialism: an Experimental Approach
* 
 
Fernando Aguiar  Pablo Brañas-Garza 
 
Instituto de Estudios Sociales Andalucía 
CSIC  
 
Dpto. de Teoría e Historia Económica 
Universidad de Granada          
 
 
Abstract: In a series of influential papers, Samuel Scheffler argues in favour of an agent-
centred prerogative that limits the demands of consequentialism while defending the personal 
standpoint. More recently, Tim Mulgan has proposed another prerogative as part of a 
comprehensive consequentialist theory which attempts to deal adequately with some of the 
problems of Scheffler’s hybrid theory.  In both cases, prerogatives are held to be grounded in 
intuitions or considered moral judgements.  But is this really so?  In this article we perform two 
economic experiments using a dictator game in which individuals must make a moral decision – 
to give or not to give an amount of money to poor people in the Third World.  A questionnaire 
in which the subjects are asked about the reasons for their decision shows that, at least in this 
case, the prerogatives appear to form part of individuals’ moral decisions.  The dictator game 
provides a useful tool to deal with the narrow reflective equilibrium model; a model which 
deserves greater interest than it has thus far been given.  Experimental economics can be of 
great utility in approaching the moral intuitions of people. 
 


















1.  Introduction 
Over the last two decades we have witnessed an intense and complex debate regarding 
the nature and limits of consequentialism. Although there are many ways of 
understanding consequentialism, the debate has primarily focused on the more general 
and commonly accepted definition of act-consequentialism.  According to this 
standpoint, an act is morally right if it produces the best overall outcome from an 
impersonal point of view. From a personal viewpoint, however, these demands can be 
unreasonable, as they oblige us to reject both the obligations we supposedly have 
towards those closest to us (my children, my parents, my friends) as well as our life 
plans and projects.  In other words, a consequentialist view of what is morally right 
seems to exclude the duties and autonomy of individuals, that is, agent-relative values.  
By demanding the maximization of impersonal values, consequentialism appears to 
impose unlimited moral sacrifices upon individuals, thus violating their moral integrity.  
  Samuel Scheffler, whose work is central to the recent debate
1, argues that it is 
difficult to deal with these problems by rejecting consequentialism in favour of a 
deontological theory.  In Scheffler’s opinion, it is much more plausible to explain and 
defend an agent-centred prerogative that permits individuals to attend to their own 
interests and personal commitments.  Scheffler proposes a hybrid theory that seeks an 
equilibrium between agent-neutral values and agent-relative values.  The prerogative 
would be coherent with the common sense morality
2 that accommodates people’s 
personal plans.   
  Yet, is it true that a hybrid view accommodates the moral intuitions of 
individuals better than consequentialism? Does common sense morality embody a sort 
of agent-centred prerogative or safeguard the personal standpoint in another way?  From 
a methodological viewpoint, defenders and critics of consequentialism alike appeal to 
the intuitions or considered moral judgements of people to support their respective 
views. With this aim, they commonly resort to hypothetical examples in their moral 
arguments to prompt readers to set their own moral intuitions in motion and contrast   4
them with the theory that the author in question attempts to defend.
3  In this paper, we 
will attempt to adopt a different focus. We analyze the results of two economic 
experiments that were carried out in order to ascertain if individuals adopt a clearly 
consequentialist moral stance or if instead they reach some sort of equilibrium between 
neutral values and agent-relative values.  In other words, we have designed an economic 
experiment that attempts to put consequentialism to the test of moral intuitions in order 
to discover whether these intuitions support consequentialism or more closely resemble 
a hybrid moral theory. 
  To the best of our knowledge, economic experiments are not commonly used in 
ethical theory.
4 By using this method we attempt, on the one hand, to follow Darwall, 
Gibbard and Railton’s recommendation that ethical theory be increasingly grounded in 
sound empirical investigation. On the other hand, we hope to fulfil the need for 
consequentialism to tell, in Frank Jackson’s words, “a story in terms of what is in the 
agent´s mind at the time of action”
5; a task that proves impossible in the hypothetical 
examples commonly used in ethics, but not in economic experiments. The reason for 
this is that economic experiments permit us to deal with the idea of narrow reflective 
equilibrium. When using experimental economics to approach an ethical question, we 
do not attempt to oblige the subject to consider diverse theories and arguments in order 
to confirm their force – which according to Rawls would lead us to a wide reflective 
equilibrium – but rather to analyse whether “general convictions, first principles, and 
particular judgements are in line” with the least number of revisions.
6 By using 
economic experiments we will attempt to defend the utility of the narrow reflective 
equilibrium in ethics.  
The article is structured as follows.  A debate on the need to limit the unreasonable 
demands of consequentialism by means of distinct agent-centred prerogatives is 
presented in the next section.  This debate, which we will submit to the judgement of 
moral intuitions, will provide us with guidelines as to how to design our economic 
experiment.  In our opinion, the best way to create a context in which individuals make 
use of their moral intuitions to confirm if they are in narrow reflective equilibrium with 
consequentialist principles or with some type of prerogative is to design a version of 
what is known as the Dictator Game (DG).  In the third section, the game is presented 
and a hypothesis developed regarding dictators’ behaviour in the context of what we 
call a moral DG.  The forth section includes the design and results of our moral   5
experiments with the DG.  The article then concludes with a methodological excursus 




2.  Two agent-centred prerogatives 
 
In his work The Rejection of Consequentialism, Samuel Scheffler’s express aim is to 
propose a hybrid moral theory that frees individuals (liberation strategy) from the 
obligation to always maximize the impersonal good in order for his moral action to be 
considered right.  This theory accommodates agent-relative values through a prerogative 
that permits agents “to devote energy and attention to his projects and commitments out 
of proportion to their weight in the impersonal calculus”.
7  In its most precise version, 
Scheffler’s agent-centred prerogative affirms the following: 
 
“Suppose...that each agent were allowed to give M times more weight to his own interests than 
to the interests of anyone else. This would mean that an agent was permitted to perform his 
preferred act (call it P), provided that there was no alternative A open to him, such that (1) A 
would produce a better overall outcome than P, as judged from an impersonal standpoint which 
gives equal weight to everyone’s interests, and (2) the total net loss to others of his doing P 
rather than A was more than M times as great as the net loss to him of doing A rather than P.”
8 
 
  The prerogative does not give individuals a carte blanche to pursue their non-
optimal projects at any time – it is not a defence of egoism. This is not a protected zone 
in which people can do as they please.  According to Scheffler, this is the best way - a 
way which is compatible with the moral intuitions of individuals - for the moral theory 
to guarantee the independence of the personal standpoint; an independence that 
consequentialism undermines.  The alternative views do not achieve this objective with 
the same efficiency.  On the one hand, what Scheffler calls the maximization strategy 
pursues that the greatest possible number of people are able to carry out their plans and 
projects, but this means excluding many others who cannot carry out theirs.  On the 
other hand, given its paradoxical nature, it is more difficult to justify deontological 
restrictions than the agent-centred prerogative.
9   6
  Scheffler’s hybrid theory has been widely analysed and criticised.  As regards 
the question that is of interest to us here, that is, if people’s moral intuitions support the 
prerogatives, we will focus on two of these objections. The first, Kagan’s 
allowing/doing objection, is widely known and has been largely debated.  It can be 
summed up as follows: common sense morality distinguishes between allowing harm or 
doing harm, while Scheffler’s prerogative weakens this distinction.  Thus it cannot form 
part of common sense morality.  According to Kagan, we can deduce from Scheffler’s 
theory that is permissible for a person to allow someone else to suffer an n-sized harm if 
it means saving a q-sized cost. Hence, ceteris paribus, it will be permissible for that 
person to cause harm directly to another if by doing so cost q is avoided.  The agent-
centred prerogative not only says nothing about the type of personal projects that people 
can pursue – there are no deontological restrictions that limit them – but does not 
differentiate between the diverse forms – morally legitimate or not – of pursuing those 
projects.
10 
  Secondly, the fact that Scheffler’s prerogative is proportional – the cost exacted 
to a person is proportional to the amount of good that his action produces – poses two 
problems. First, the prerogative continues to be almost as demanding as 
consequentialism (Mulgan’s Demandingness Objection)
11 given that the agents would 
have to bear high personal costs if the impersonal good that their maximizing A action 
produces is so great that it far exceeds the personal benefits of the preferred action P.  
Thus, the personal standpoint is in peril once again; precisely that which Scheffler 
attempts to safeguard at all costs.  Furthermore, when choosing between A and P, the 
agent’s moral obligation will vary in a decisive manner depending on irrelevant 
empirical information (Mulgan’s Wrong Facts Objection).  The following hypothetical 
example given by Tim Mulgan serves to clarify this point and will be of great use to us 
later.
12  Let us suppose that Affluent, a wealthy person in the developed world, wants to 
donate part of her money to Oxfam instead of donating it to a local theatre company but 
she does not know if the organization will be capable of using the money efficiently.  
Affluent only knows that the three following cases can occur: i) Oxfam’s efficiency, 
that is, the productivity achieved from every dollar invested to reduce hunger has 
decline to 10 per cent with respect to its normal level so that now each dollar spent 
produces  only one-tenth of what it previously produced; ii) Oxfam’s efficiency has 
remained the same; iii) Oxfam’s efficiency has improved tenfold. According to 
Scheffler’s hybrid view, Affluent would have to donate ten times more to the super-  7
efficient Oxfam than to the normal Oxfam, and ten times less to the inefficient Oxfam. 
If Oxfam is inefficient, Scheffler’s prerogative permits Affluent to make less sacrifices, 
meaning that she will be able to pursue a greater number of non-optimal projects (for 
example, she could spend more money on travelling) than if Oxfam were efficient. As 
Mulgan rightly points out, moral obligation cannot vary so radically according to 
empirical facts.
13  To avoid the Wrong Facts Objection, Mulgan proposes a non-
proportional agent-centred prerogative based on an M variable – where M is the weight 
that the agent can assign to her non-optimal interests as compared to the impersonal 
value.  This M will be “indexed to both the goal the agent was pursuing and her level of 
well-being”.
14 Mulgan divides a person’s well-being into needs and goals.  In the Realm 
of Necessity, act-consequentialism would be the appropriate moral criterion since needs 
“are not optional, discretionary, or community dependent, unlike goal-based claims”.
15 
In the Realm of Reciprocity - the realm in which interaction between individuals who 
pursue different goals is governed – rule-consequentialism would be the right moral 
conception. In this realm a series of rules are needed (non-interference, autonomy, 
moderate demands…), “to facilitate the pursuit of goals” and the agents “must be 
provided with some range of pursuable goals, but no particular set of goals is 
required”.
16 To balance these two realms an agent-centred prerogative must be subjected 
to three types of constraints: not all goals are permitted (range constraint), the ways 
agents pursue their goals are restricted (method constraint) and the weight they can 
attach to their interests with regard to the overall good is limited (weight constraint).
17  
Mulgan´s non-proportional agent-centred prerogative balances impersonal reasons to 
promote the impersonal good (value-based reasons) and the costs exacted to the agent 
(cost-based reasons): 
“The non-proportional ACP [Agent-centred prerogative]. An act x is permissible if and only 
if for any other act available to the agent (call it y) the weight cost the agent would have borne if 
she had performed y instead of x is GREATER than the agent´s value-based reason to do y 
rather than x”
18  
  Regardless of the problems that this may pose, it is clear that this prerogative, 
which is indexed to the individual’s level of well-being and the goals she pursues, does 
not demand unnecessary sacrifices from the agents (unlike Scheffler’s) based on 
irrelevant empirical information.  Mulgan’s Combined Consequentialism – act and rule-
consequentialism and prerogative- seems therefore to safeguard the personal point of   8
view without lapsing into the Demandingness Objection.
19 Now, is Mulgan´s non-




3.  Moral distance and the dictator game 
Tim Mulgan’s moral intuitions, his considered moral judgements, are expressed 
clearly in his book The Demands of Consequentialism in a serious attempt to seek a 
wide reflective equilibrium between consequentialist moral principles, moral intuitions 
and background theories.  But what are Affluent’s moral intuitions?  What crosses 
Affluent’s mind when she makes the decision? Rawls refers to the moral theorist as an 
observer “who seeks to set out the structure of other people´s moral conceptions and 
attitudes”, including himself in the observation.
20  But that structure is difficult to 
construe in a direct way.  The role of the hypothetical example of Affluent serves 
precisely to clarify our intuitions.
21  The scope of this “our”, however, is very limited as 
it only refers to the readers of Mulgan’s book in this case.  Could we not instead try to 
approach Affluent’s moral intuitions – that is, the people that surround us – in a direct 
way?  If this were possible, we would be able to confirm if common sense morality 
accommodates agent-centred prerogatives in some manner, be they proportional or not.  
And we could confirm if those prerogatives are constrained by the level of well-being 
and personal goals.  In other words, we could confirm if Scheffler’s or Mulgan’s 
proposal to limit the demands of consequentialism by means of a prerogative are, at 
least, in narrow reflective equilibrium with people’s moral intuitions.  In case they are 
not in narrow equilibrium, we must determine what this disequilibrium implies. 
Let us suppose that Affluent decides all alone in her bedroom how much she should 
give Oxfam, but does not know whether or not Oxfam is efficient. Let us also assume 
that no one knows- not even the Oxfam administrators – that it is she who has made the 
donation.  Affluent donates the money anonymously so that her decision is purely moral 
and not influenced by extra-moral factors (i.e. to make a good impression on her 
friends, the community, etc.)  In this case the decision that Affluent must make and the 
passive situation of the recipient (Oxfam) permits us to establish structural similarities 
between Mulgan’s hypothetical example – and other similar examples in the literature   9
on consequentialism – and what is known in the field of experimental economics as the 
Dictator Game (DG).
22 
In standard DG experiments, dictators are given an envelope containing 10 one-
dollar bills and read a series of instructions in which they are told that the amount of 
money has been assigned to their partner (the recipient) and to them, but that they are 
the only ones who can divide the money as they see fit (hence the name “dictator”). In 
this situation there exist at least three sources or different types of information which are 
relevant to the decision: i) information provided by the dictator himself, that is, the 
possibility that his decision be observed by others or not; ii) information the dictator 
receives about the recipient and iii) information gained from the specific language used 
in the instructions and the decision frame.  It has been demonstrated that depending on 
the type of information provided, the outcome of the DG can vary enormously.  Thus, in 
the first case, when the dictator can act under conditions of absolute privacy and 
anonymity, in other words, when no one knows whether the dictator has given money or 
not, hardly anyone donates anything – voluntary contributions tend to be low, around 
10% of the pie on average.  Indeed, Hoffman, McCabe and Smith have shown that as 
anonymity diminishes, the offers or donations increase.  In their view, this is due to the 
fact that anonymity produces “social distance”; a concept they define as “the degree of 
reciprocity that subjects believe exists within a social interaction”.
23  Social isolation 
that results in anonymity and the lack of a sense of community give rise to self-
interested behaviour. 
However, when the dictator receives reliable information regarding the recipient, 
even when anonymity is maintained, donations also increase. When the dictator receives 
no information about the recipient, he may have doubts as to the recipient’s existence, 
and therefore have no reason to give the money.  In contrast, if dictators are shown 
pictures of the recipients, 25% give as much as half of the total amount, although 58% 
still keep all the money.  If the dictators are told that their donation will go to the Red 
Cross, 31% give part of the money (17% give half the amount) and 10% give the full 
amount.  Offers also increase when dictators are told the recipient’s surname, if the 
dictator is given proof that the recipient really exists or if they are told that the recipient 
is a fellow classmate.  If the dictator reveals his conduct, that is, if the conditions of 
anonymity are relaxed, or if he has information about the recipients, donations will be   10
higher, although the full amount will never be donated – except in the case of the Red 
Cross.






TABLE 1: DONATIONS MADE IN VARIOUS EXPERIMENTS WITH AND WITHOUT 
INFORMATION ABOUT THE RECIPIENT 






NOTHING           ≥50%                    TOTAL 
                                                       AMOUNT 
HMS-96  ----  10*1$  63,8%        8,0%  0,0% 
EG-96 RED  CROSS  10*1$ 27,0% 31,2%  10,0% 
CG-01 SURNAME  100  PT.*  26,0%  43,0%  0% 
FOM1-01 CLASSMATE  10*1$  35,2%  41,1%  5% 
FOM2-01 EXISTENCE 
KNOWN 
10*1$ 47,3% 26,3%  0% 
B-03 PHOTO  10*1$  58,3%  25,5%  0% 
 * PT. = points. 
  It is true that unlike the hypothetical examples used in ethics, the DG 
experiments are not designed to detect the moral intuitions behind the decision to donate 
all or part of the amount or not to donate.  Even the most widely-cited experiments in 
economic literature are not intended to confirm if intuitions and morals theories are in 
narrow reflective equilibrium.  However, the structure of the DG (which is similar to 
that of Mulgan’s hypothetical example) and the fact that when the dictator has 
information about the recipients donations increase, facilitates the use of this type of 
experimental game in ethics.  More specifically to the case which interests us here, the 
DG can serve to confirm if the moral agents limit to some extent the maximization of 
neutral values by means of an agent-centred prerogative.  In other words, the DG is the 
tool that will allow us to ascertain here if a hybrid theory is, at least, in narrow reflective 
equilibrium.   11
  With this aim, and before turning to the experiment we have specifically 
designed, let us propose the following hypothesis.  The smaller the moral distance 
between the dictator and the recipients, the larger the donations and the greater the 
number of dictators that will give money. Drawing on Hoffman, McCabe and Smith’s 
concept of social distance, we define moral distance as the dictator’s degree of moral 
obligation towards the recipient.
26  If we design the experimental situation in such a way 
as to affirm that donating is the morally right option under any moral conception 
(consequentialist, deontological or hybrid), the moral distance between the dictator and 
the recipient will be null and the dictator ought to donate all or part of the money, 
depending, of course, on how the experiment is designed.  The moral distance between 
the dictator and the recipient is null, then, when any moral conception, be it 
deontological, consequentialist or hybrid, converge in the outcome, that is, it prescribes 
that the dictator should choose “to donate”.  In a situation such as this one, the dictator 
has the actual obligation to donate since it “is an obligation which, in a particular 
situation, is not superseded by any other obligation.”
27 
  If the situation is such that donating cannot be said to be the morally right action, 
moral distance will be maximum.  Or to put it more simply: when moral distance is 
maximum, it does not matter whether the dictator donates or not from an ethical 
standpoint – the dictator can act legitimately one way or another without being 
considered egotistical in the ethical sense. Moral distance will depend on the relevant 
moral information that the dictator has regarding the recipient’s situation (knowing his 
surname would not always be morally relevant; knowing if he is poor or not would be). 
Nonetheless, anonymity must be guaranteed in order to rule out the possible influence 
of reputation. Now, the fact that one ought to donate does not mean, of course, that 
dictators will do so, just as the absence of a moral obligation to donate does not mean 
that one cannot give money.  For this reason, the freedom that the dictator has to give or 
not give and the greater or lesser moral distance between the dictator and the recipient 
permits us to attribute moral motivations to the dictators in the following way: 
a.   If the moral distance between the dictator and the recipient is null and 
the donations are also null or very low, the dictator behaves in a morally 
egotistical manner.     12
b.  If the moral distance between the dictator and the recipient is maximum 
and the dictator donates nothing at all, the dictator is a reasonable self-
interested individual. 
c.  If the moral distance between the dictator and the recipient is maximum 
and the dictator gives part of her money, she performs an act of 
generosity. 
d.  If the moral distance between the dictator and the recipient is null and the 
dictator gives part or all of her money, her behaviour is ethical. 
The following table shows DG moral motivations according to the moral 
distance between the dictator and the recipient. 
TABLE 2:  DG MORAL MOTIVATIONS 
  DONATE  DO NOT DONATE 
Maximum Moral Distance   Generosity  Reasonable self-interest 
Null Moral Distance   Ethical behaviour  Selfishness 
What our hypothesis maintains, then, is that the smaller the moral distance 
between the dictator and the recipient, the larger the donations and the greater the 
number of donors.  Now, the mere decision to give when moral distance is null does not 
tell us if the dictator justifies her choice in consequentialist terms of if she has 
established some sort of prerogative.  It only tells us that her moral intuitions may be in 
equilibrium with some moral view.  In order to know which one, we must expressly ask 
the “dictators” about the reasons for their decision – about what goes through their 
minds at the time of action.  By asking them directly we will know if they justify their 
donations in consequentialist terms or in other terms.  It is then that we will see if there 
is some type of prerogative in play. 
3.  Two Moral Experiments with a Dictator Game: Design and results 
To confirm to what degree both the donations and the number of donors increase 
when the moral distance between the dictator and the recipient is null, it is necessary to 
design a DG situation in which the moral structure of the problem is clear.  Thus the 
aim is to design a situation in which not donating is the morally wrong action from any 
moral standpoint.
28  In other words, in order to take advantage of the DG so as to   13
analyze if a consequentialist-type ethic limited by an agent-centred prerogative is in 
narrow reflective equilibrium with the moral intuitions of individuals, we must design a 
DG that structurally resembles the problem faced by Affluent when deciding whether or 
not to give money to Oxfam. On the one hand, this means, that we must see if the 
decision made by the individuals corresponds to the maximization of the impersonal 
value and if this is so, if the individuals consider that they would limit that 
maximization, in some case,  by means of some type of prerogative.  In order to do so it 
is essential to allow individuals to make their decision under conditions of complete 
anonymity and privacy so as to avoid any bias due to reputation (i.e. to demonstrate 
before others, albeit without true moral conviction, that one is fulfilling one’s moral 
obligation) or due to imitation ( I give because others give and I do not give if they do 
not give).  The objective, then, is that the decision reveal their moral intuitions, and not 
something else.  Furthermore, this requires that the dictators have morally pertinent 
information about the recipients, in other words, that they are able to identify the moral 
nature of their decision.  Finally, the instructions must prevent dictators from thinking 
that they are merely playing a game and that their recipients do not actually exist. 
 
4.1 Design and results of the experiments
29 
The first experiment was carried out with 77 students from the University of 
Córdoba (Spain) in November 2002.  Subjects were asked to collaborate in a research 
study on the problems that arise when trying to distribute non-divisible and finite goods.  
We avoided using the term “experiment” in order to dispel the possible negative effects 
of the word.  Once the study was explained, the subjects received a large envelope 
containing the following items: a small envelope, three 5€ bills,
30 a questionnaire, 
instructions and a sheet with 341 numerical codes; three of which were marked with a 
circle.  In the instructions the students were informed that the 341 codes referred to 
centres that receive medicines in Asia, Africa and South America, that they had been 
assigned three of these centres and that for every 5€ they donated,  a box of medicines 
would be sent to one of “their” three centres.  All of the subjects in the experiment had 
to write the three codes on their small envelope and circle those centres – a maximum of 
three – to which they allotted the 5€ in medicines.  However, the subjects were also told 
that they had the right to keep 5€ for participating in the research study on the 
distribution of goods.  Logically, if they kept 5€ for themselves, one of the centres   14
would not receive any medicines (in this case they were told not to mark one of the 
three centres that had been assigned to them).  The procedure was performed under 
conditions of complete anonymity by means of a double-blind mechanism similar to 
that described by Hoffman, McCabe and Smith.
31 The questionnaire included questions 
regarding sex, age, the weekly allowance their parents gave them
32 (none of the 
experimental subjects – all of whom were university students- had a paying job) and the 
reasons for their decision. 
Using the same instructions and under identical conditions of anonymity a new 
experiment was performed in March 2003 with 98 students from the University of Jaen 
(Spain).  The subjects were placed in four groups.  This experiment was hypothetical as 
the subjects were not given real money and had to decide how to divide the amount  
hypothetically by responding to a series of questions.  Furthermore, the decision was 
made under three distinct scenarios which were presented to them in a random manner: 
 
  a. In one of the treatments the dictators had no information about the recipient. 
b. In another treatment the dictators knew that the three recipients were poor 
people from the Third World who would receive the money that they decided to 
give. 
c. In the third treatment the subjects knew that the money would be used to buy 
medicines for poor people in the Third World. 
The results of the experiments are shown in Table 3. 
 
TABLE 3: TWO MORAL DICTATOR GAME EXPERIMENTS 
 HYPOTHETICAL  EXPERIMENT  REAL 
EXPERIMENT 




15 0  40.8%  68.3%  74.6% 
10 0  25.5%  18.3%  12% 
5 28.6%  11.2%  5.1%  10.7% 
0 71.4%  22.4%  8.1%  2.7%   15
N  98 98 98 73 
 
4.2 Dictators’ arguments to justify their decision 
The data from these two experiments speak for themselves. It appears that when 
the moral nature of the decision problem is clear and moral distance is null, the 
donations greatly increase in DG contexts.  With the exception of the case in which 
subjects lack information, the aim of the experiment was not to give money to people 
who do not need it, but to very needy people.  Moreover, the needier the people – these 
are people who are poor and need medicines – the greater the number of subjects who 
donate the full amount.
33  As revealed in the decision made by the majority of subjects, 
there appears to be an evident moral obligation to donate.  The fact that the subjects do 
not believe that they are merely playing a game (as attested to in the questionnaires) or 
think that they are performing an experiment or that the recipient of the money or 
medicines does not exist, gives force to this conclusion.
34  In such circumstances – 
when there is clear moral information and credible non-moral information – the morally 
right action, from any standpoint, is to donate the full amount given that both 
experiments use a group of Affluents whose well-being is not affected by the donation; 
a donation which will serve to alleviate the poverty or illness of poor individuals in the 
Third World. 
That this is in fact the case, or in other words, the fact that dictators actually 
measure moral distances, is even more evident when we observe the reasons given by 
subjects to explain why they gave nothing when lacking information about the recipient 
and moral distance was therefore greatest. They explained their decision with statements 
such as “I don’t know who is going to get it, they might have more than me”, “I might 
need it for something more important than the recipients”, “if I don’t have any 
information about who the money is going to or what it is going to be used for, I won’t 
donate it” or “it could be someone who is richer than me”; statements which were 
repeated time and again to justify their action.  When information about the recipient is 
lacking, it is perfectly legitimate to give priority to oneself: if the money goes to 
someone who needs it less than I do, I would be doing an injustice to myself.  In short, 
there is no moral obligation to give anything.  Of course this does not exclude 
generosity, which, as we have seen, was one of the possible reasons for the DG   16
decision. In our hypothetical experiment, no less than 28.6% of the subjects donated 
one-third of the money – 5€ – in spite of having no information about the recipient. 
All of the DG motivations are present in these two experiments.  These include 
the reasonable self-interest of those who lack information about the recipient and give 
nothing or the generosity of those who lack information and give part of the money; the 
ethical conduct of those who give the full amount to others who need it, or the 
egotistical behaviour of those who keep all or part of the money even when they believe 
that they can save lives with a very small donation, which in principle does not affect 
their own well-being. 
Yet is the donation perceived as a maximization of the neutral or impersonal 
value?  In other words, is it viewed in strictly consequentialist terms? Or do the subjects 
compare this maximization to the personal cost incurred to them in the decision or the 
personal cost that may have been incurred under different circumstances? Do they 
establish some sort of prerogative based on this comparison? 
In both experiments the majority of those who give all the money (81%) always 
justify their decision in consequentialist terms; albeit with two distinct types of 
consequentialism: almost half of those who give all the money (49%) justify their 
decision in terms of decision-theoretic consequentialism and one-third (32%) justify the 
reasons for their choice in terms of a neutral or impersonal consequentialism restricted 
to impersonal values.
35 Neutral consequentialism is clearly presented as the 
maximization of the impersonal value in statements such as “the more people that have 
medicines the better” or “the money is going to a good cause”.  Decision-theoretic 
consequentialism is demonstrated in the choice of an action that produces the best 
outcome, including one which will benefit the agent.  The experimental subjects 
manifested this in statements such as “I’m not losing anything”, “the money isn’t mine, 
I didn’t earn it”, “they need it more than me”, “it’s of more use to them than to me”, 
“it’s not going to do me any good”, “it benefits them more than me”, or “I didn’t have 
the money when I came and I still don’t”.  In both cases the majority of the subjects 
therefore acknowledge that the moral distance with poor individuals who need 
medicines is null and that they ought to donate the fifteen euros.  However, for the 
decision-theoretic consequentialists this is the case because when ranking the possible 
outcomes from best to worst (including themselves), they consider that keeping all or 
part of the money does not benefit them in any way whatsoever.   17
This decision-theoretic consequentialism, on which half of the subjects who give 
all the money base their moral intuitions, is not affected by the Demandingness 
Objection. This is due to the fact that when subjects include themselves in the 
maximizing exercise, they will always seek the equilibrium between their agent-relative 
and agent-neutral values when the cost of promoting their neutral values is too high.  On 
the other hand, this consequentialism, which is in narrow reflective equilibrium with the 
moral intuitions of a large part of the subjects, seems to be sensitive to the 
allowing/doing distinction.  It is true that the subjects will not donate medicines to poor 
strangers when the cost of giving them affects their own interests.  Yet what is 
understood by interests?  These are not just any interests.  At no time in either 
experiment do those who defend decision-theoretic consequentialism  - in which agent-
relative values and neutral values enter into a single maximizing process- justify their 
choice in purely egotistical or capricious terms.  In light of the answers given on the 
questionnaires, for those subjects – or dictators- who justify their decision to donate the 
fifteen euros in terms of a decision-theoretic consequentialism, the maximization of the 
agent-relative values with respect to the neutral values would only be justified according 
to their own basic needs, personal merit and personal goals. It is for this reason that 
they donate the 15 euros here: their “needs are covered”, “I didn’t earn the money” and 
“it’s not going to do me any good”.  If one’s basic needs are not covered, it would be 
logical to assume that the maximization of the outcome would mean satisfying those 
needs.  But even when those needs are satisfied, subjects stated on the questionnaires 
that if they had earned the money legitimately, that is, by their own means, and it had 
not been given to them freely by strangers, perhaps they would not have donated the full 
amount since they were not responsible for the poverty. 
Finally, when the students stated that the money was “not going to do me any 
good”, what they meant was that since the donation was so small, had they chosen to 
keep it, they would not have been able to pursue their personal projects.  In the 
questionnaires and during the discussion with the students following the experiment 
(when they were told what the experiment was really all about), many of them assured 
us that if the amount had been larger – for example, 1500 euros instead of just 15- they 
would have kept some of it for themselves.  If the amount of money in the hands of the 
dictators were larger, there is a chance (which is implicit in the form of   18
consequentialism that they defend) that they would devote part of it for their own 
personal use. 
Thus Affluent’s moral intuitions - or the moral intuitions of our experimental 
subjects – seem to be on the most part consequentially motivated.
36  However, most 
subjects that donate the full amount try to optimize the good while taking into account 
their own needs, the needs of others and their personal goals and establish criteria to 
determine when they can fulfil these personal goals beyond the impersonal good.  This 
can be understood as a sort of non-proportional prerogative indexed to one’s own level 
of well-being, merits and personal projects.  Thus, for a great many of our subjects, 
common sense morality dictates that their obligation is “a function of the relative 
weights of both the neutral and the relative values at stake in a particular choice 
situation”.
37  Following upon this viewpoint, we can contend, then, that the agent-
centred prerogatives are clearly in consonance with common sense morality in our 
experiments, as Scheffler maintains. However, they are closer to a non-proportional 
prerogative. In other words, they are closer to Mulgan’s combined consequentialism 
than to Scheffler’s hybrid theory.  But in any case we can assert that some form of 




4.  Methodological excursus: Dictator Game, moral intuitions and reflective 
equilibrium 
Like other economic experiments, the DG can be a useful tool for understanding 
peoples’ moral intuitions.  In ethics and moral philosophy it is common to use 
hypothetical examples and counter-examples to test theories against readers’ intuitions 
or judgements.  While hypothetical examples often have the defect that they are forced 
or removed from peoples’ moral reality, they also have the virtue of permitting us to set 
up very extreme situations; situations which sometimes occur in real life and which put 
our moral intuitions and the capacity of the theories to respond to these intuitions to the 
test. Experiments with Dictator Games – or other economic experiments- have the 
virtue of dealing with real people in decision contexts controlled by experimenters and 
the defect that some situations are impossible to transfer to the laboratory setting.  It 
would appear, then, that the virtues and defects of hypothetical examples and   19
experiments complement one another and it is more effective to use them whenever 
possible.  In this section, however, we are not going to compare hypothetical examples 
to economic experiments as a complementary or alternative, privileged or unprivileged 
way to access people’s moral intuitions.  Instead we will focus on something more 
specifically related to the present article, that is, the value of the DG to approach 
people’s intuitions or considered moral judgements and their possible relationship, as 
mentioned above, to the reflective equilibrium method. 
The Dictator Game was not designed as a way to find out people’s moral 
intuitions, but to test the hypothesis regarding the motivational egoism of economic 
agents.  If we assume that individuals are rational (in the economic sense of the term) 
and egotistical, game theory predicts that the dictator will never give anything.   
However, when this game – and not only this one – is brought to the laboratory setting 
“a surprisingly large amount of other-regarding behaviour is the common finding”.
39  
Because of this the observation reports which economists use to test their hypotheses -
the decisions made by individuals together with objective data such as age, sex, level of 
income or other similar information- can serve to show if the preferences that dictators 
reveal in the laboratory are ethical or not, that is, if they converge with the normative 
prescriptions of one or all moral conceptions. This convergence is still very vague, as 
we do not know if these preferences converge for moral or other reasons. But that does 
not impede the DG, even at this superficial level, from providing two types of filters: in 
a moral context the DG filters both preferences and theories.  It filters revealed 
preferences of dictators who choose not to donate when moral distance is null and it 
filters theories that recommend that the dictator never donate anything.  Game theory, 
for example, which recommends that the dictator always keep all the money (not 
donating is a subgame perfect equilibrium in a DG) can be a useful tool in ethical 
theory, but cannot itself be an ethical theory.  In contrast, Scheffler’s hybrid theory or 
Mulgan’s Combined Consequentialism would indeed pass that first filter; a filter which 
is hardly subtle and has nothing to do with reflective equilibrium, but nonetheless 
continues to be important. Let us not be misled by the lack of subtlety of the filters in a 
DG with morally relevant information about the partner. Imagine what would happen if 
no one ever gave anything in the DG experiments.  In a game-theoretic world, for 
example, ethical theories would be useless artefacts.  Fortunately, the world isn’t like 
that.  In our world, “dictators” measure moral distances, assess their resources and   20
plans, and they give money.  Now, when we have no information other than the 
preferences revealed in the laboratory it is impossible to know if these preferences, 
which we have termed ethical in the DG context, respond to moral or non-moral 
motives (chance, religious motives, whims, tradition, culture, etc.). Thus it is necessary 
to examine the reasons behind the action. 
To overcome this limitation, experimental subjects must be asked directly about 
the reasons for their decision as we have done here, thus transforming the positive DG 
into a motivational DG.  The questionnaire that was handed out to the subjects of our 
experiments literally asked them the following: “Could you please tell me the reasons 
for your decision in the problem posed here?”.  Asking about the reasons or motives for 
action in a dictator game can pose some problems in an experimental context. They are 
problems, however, which appear to have a solution. For the experimental economist 
that attempts to test the methodological supposition of egoism, the verbal reports used 
here to find out the subjects’ reason for their decision could be similar to what is known 
in game theory as cheap talk. If there is no incentive to tell the truth, to express one’s 
motives in a sincere manner, people can say whatever they please because talk is cheap.  
However, the verbal reports used here as a departure point to approach 
experimental subject´s moral judgments have not only been shown to be in line with the 
DG motivations chart, but also in the case of those who donated the whole amount - in 
both the real and the hypothetical experiment – the reasons were notably alike.  It would 
seem, then, that the agents were not simply talking for talking’s sake and even less so if 
we consider the conditions of anonymity under which the experiment was carried out. 
In a context such as this one, the only possible reason for not telling the truth about 
one’s decision would be either self-denial or incredulity with the experiment.  In short, 
the verbal reports - an essential element from the normative standpoint – can be 
controlled perfectly in the laboratory, at least in a DG. 
The verbal reports are not simply a complement to the observation reports.   
Instead they are a reflective justification of one’s own action; justifications that are 
quasi-theoretical in nature. Individuals that have given all the money justify their action 
for moral reasons and beliefs about the state of the world.  Unlike hypothetical 
examples such as that of Affluent, the DG permits us to place individuals in an actual 
moral decision-making context and, through an anonymous questionnaire, make them 
reflect upon their decision. This decision-making and reflection process is what makes   21
the DG a useful tool for approaching the reflective equilibrium method as it enables the 
observer to confirm if general convictions, first principles and particular judgements are 
in line.  Without question, this goes beyond the positive use of the DG in ethics, which 
is of very limited usefulness.  By asking in the laboratory about the reasons for the 
decision in such a way as to allow the subject to answer under conditions of total 
anonymity, we not only obtain the revealed preferences but also the reasons on which 
they are based.  These reasons can permit us to know if the decision is made for moral 
or other motives – religious, cultural, and so on- when relevant moral information is 
given in order to make the decision.  When the reasons are moral, such as those given 
by the dictators in our experiments who donated the full amount, we can analyze what 
type they are, that is, if they fit the consequentialist, the deontological or the hybrid 
mould.  This is possible because the subjects’ justification is already implicitly 
theoretical – even though they clearly do not use labels such as “consequentialist” or 
“deontological” to refer to the principles that inspired their decision.  From this 
viewpoint, we can say that in the case of our experimental subjects, the agent-centred 
prerogatives are in reflective equilibrium.  This does not necessarily mean, however, 
that the hybrid theories are justified.  The reflective equilibrium that is achieved by 
asking the DG subjects about the reasons for their decisions is, as we have said, narrow 
not wide.  For the equilibrium to be wide, the experimental subjects would have to 
carefully consider the alternative moral concepts and evaluate the force of their 
arguments through a deep critical reflection on their intuitions.  This brings up two final 
questions: Does the narrow reflective equilibrium lack in relevance? Can economic 
experiments, and the DG in particular, be a useful tool for dealing with the wide 
reflective equilibrium method? 
As we have already seen, what we have called the positive use of the DG is not 
of great value to ethical theory and yet it is not completely lacking in worth. If the 
ethical theories converge in the solutions that they provide for the moral problem posed 
to the dictator, we can at least confirm how many subjects do what the theories say they 
should – or, in the negative language of economists- how many subjects do not do what 
they should, how many deviate from what the theories prescribe. Perhaps this 
quantification seems a bit trivial at first glance.  However, its value lies in what can be 
perceived, as we have already said, what it would mean to ethical theory if no one ever 
gave anything in any DG, whatever the situation might be.  If, on the contrary, we are   22
capable of showing that people measure moral distances in a DG and largely make their 
decisions depending on that distance, we will be on the road to disentangling people’s 
intuitions or moral judgments and how they are in line with different moral theories.  In 
other words, a DG designed in such a way as to make subjects’ moral motives evident, 
provides us with the distribution of the diverse narrow reflective equilibrium in a 
population.  This is not quite the same as discovering the grammar of a language.
40  
Most speakers, even when they are competent in the language they speak, do not know 
why they use the terms they do.  In fact, the majority are able to use prepositions 
correctly without knowing why – often without even knowing what a preposition is.  
However, when a narrow reflective equilibrium occurs in a motivational DG, it appears 
that people do know why they have given money and you can ask them.  It is precisely 
the answer to this “why” which provides the observing moral theorist with the 
considered moral judgments in line with one or several ethical theories.  On most 
occasions, these judgments will lead people to make moral decisions and not only those 
which can be reached after complex, drawn-out reflection.  Between the absence of 
reflection by speakers on their grammar and the deep reflection demanded by the wide 
reflective equilibrium to justify a theory there lies an intermediate point which is what 
provides us with the narrow equilibrium and which can be reached through games such 
as the Dictator Game.  It is an intermediate point at which the subjects reflect upon what 
they think they should do from a moral standpoint when they have to make an ethical 
decision; decisions which, at times, must be made spontaneously, in an instant.  If we 
are to encounter this intermediate point where people’s moral intuitions are found, we 
must use laboratory techniques to confirm if a theory is in line or not with these 
intuitions.  If they are in fact in line with the theory, then it will be in narrow strict 
equilibrium.  If, in contrast, and experiment after experiment, people’s moral intuitions 
contradict the principles of some concrete moral theory, we must ask ourselves about 
the reason for this disequilibrium. This procedure is clearly distinct from that of 
discovering the grammar of a language. 
Perhaps narrow reflective equilibrium has not been given the attention it 
deserves, bearing in mind that it is often the only thing we have when contending – as is 
often done- that this or that principle is in accordance with our moral intuitions.  It 
certainly does not serve as a method to justify moral theories given that in this first 
phase of reflection moral subjects do not submit their intuitions to the test of critical   23
arguments and counterarguments. Is it possible then to simulate in the laboratory the 
procedure that will lead subjects to reach a wide reflective equilibrium?  This would 
certainly seems like an impossible task.  This is a process of deliberation, criticism and 
self-criticism which is removed from the control of variables sought in experimental 
economics; a control that the verbal reports of our experiments still preserve.
41 If we 
expressly ask our experimental subjects if their decision is right or not and request that 
they give arguments comparing different theories and knowledge, we abandon the 
sphere of experimental economics.  But the fact that experimental economics can make 
the narrow reflective equilibrium operative is not something that should be disregarded 
if ethics aims to deal with people’s moral intuitions in an empirically grounded manner. 
5.  Conclusion 
In this article we have attempted to the answer the question of whether the moral 
intuitions of individuals establish some sort of equilibrium between agent-centred 
values and the maximization of neutral or impersonal values.  To do so we presented 
two theoretical proposals that provide a possible solution to this equilibrium. Scheffler 
and Mulgan’s agent-centred prerogatives propose that individuals are, on occasion, 
legitimized to pursue their non-optimal projects without regard to impersonal values.  In 
our opinion, the Dictator Game is the most appropriate tool to ascertain to what point 
agent-centred prerogatives are in narrow reflective equilibrium with moral intuitions.  
Two experiments using the game have shown us that in this context people justify their 
ethical decisions in consequentially motivated terms and that the majority of subjects 
explain that their decision is based on a type of non-proportional prerogative.  The DG 
can therefore be a useful tool to approach the narrow reflective equilibrium and permit 
the observing moral theorist to speak of peoples’ moral intuitions in an empirically 
informed manner.  For this reason these experiments, already a common practice in 
economics, would be very interesting and useful in the sphere of ethical theory.   
Experiments with the DG, however, do not allow to deal with the wide reflective 
equilibrium, and are therefore not valid as a method to justify ethical theories. 
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